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tend to have heavy fur, she doesn’t just note the data; she asks
why, and that is one thing PDP models just cannot do.
Finely tuned statistical engines of the sort discussed here may
well play some role in our conceptual understanding of the world
(Keil 1991b; Marcus 2000), but if the current work serves as a
guide, such machinery seems unlikely to suffice on its own.
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Abstract: Analogical inferences are an important consequence of the way
semantic knowledge is represented, that is, with relations as explicit
structures that can take arguments. We review evidence that this
feature of semantic cognition successfully predicts how quickly and
broadly children’s concepts change with experience and show that
Rogers & McClelland’s (R&M’s) parallel distributed processing (PDP)
model fails to simulate these cognitive changes due to its handling of
relational information.
Rogers & McClelland (R&M) have presented a powerful
response to the theory-theory of concepts (Carey 1985; Keil
1989; Murphy & Medin 1985), the view that knowledge of
causal and other abstract relations among entities influences
learning, memory, and reasoning. Against this view, in Semantic
Cognition (Rogers & McClelland 2004) R&M have shown that an
artificial learner (their parallel distributed processing [PDP]
model) need not represent concepts within a theory to show
many classic phenomena of cognitive development, including
category coherence, context-sensitive generalization, conceptual
reorganization, and the causal status effect.
Despite its ability to simulate these aspects of child cognition,
R&M’s approach has a fundamental limitation: Their PDP
network does not process relational structure the way that chil-
dren do. That is, within R&M’s PDP model, relations (like ISA,
can, and has) allow the model to learn the difference between
being a predator, being capable of chasing, and actually having
prey, much as children do when recognizing that a kitten, even
when it hasn’t chased any mice, is a miniature predator-to-be.
So far, so good; but children, unlike a PDP network, can rep-
resent these relations and their fillers in a manner that preserves
relation-filler independence (i.e., relations and their fillers are
represented independently), while simultaneously representing
the bindings between roles and fillers in an explicit and
dynamic fashion. Thus, children can appreciate how “Fido
chases Felix” is like “Felix chases Fido” (same elements involved
in the same relation) and how they differ (role-bindings are
reversed; e.g., Richland et al. 2006). This capacity requires (1)
that relations and objects be coded with the same sets of units
regardless of their specific configuration (i.e., the same unit[s]
should code for the chase relation and for the object Fido regard-
less of whether Fido is chasing Felix or Felix is chasing Fido), and
(2) that the system can create and destroy bindings dynamically.
That is, it must be able to bind the units representing the chaser
role of the chase relation to the units representing Fido (and
explicitly encode that binding) when Fido is doing the chasing,
and then bind the same units that represented the chaser role
to Felix when Felix is doing the chasing.
Consequently, although the R&M model can simulate some
important aspects of cognitive development, it fails to account
for several developmental phenomena that entail relational
reasoning, such as transitive inference and analogy. These
capacities are important because they account for rapid and
broad changes in semantic cognition, such as developing the
living thing concept. For example, Opfer and Siegler (2004)
have shown that children can quickly learn abstract categories
like goal-directed agent by comparing goal-directed actions
(e.g., cats turning toward mice, caterpillars turning toward
leaves, and plants turning toward sunlight). Moreover, just as
adults interpret ambiguous blobs turning toward goals to be
living things (Opfer 2002; Schultz et al. 2004), kindergartners
who learned that plants – like animals – are goal-directed also
spontaneously induced (without feedback) that plants – like
animals – are living things, too (Opfer & Siegler 2004). This
zero-trial learning is inconsistent with the hundreds of epochs
of direct training required by the R&M model. Further, errors
that children actually make during learning – such as assuming
that only animals are living things – are consistent with their
idea that life requires some kind of goal-directed movement (nor-
mally visible only in animals), but this error is never made by the
R&M model; moreover, errors made by the model – such as
honoring a categorical distinction between sunflower/rose/
robin/salmon versus sparrow/pine/flounder – have never been
reported in the many studies investigating development of the
living things category (for review, see Opfer & Siegler 2004).
Thus, while R&M’s PDP model can simulate feature-based
learning of the living thing category, it does not actually simulate
children’s relation-based learning of the living thing category.
Children make analogical inferences such as those found in
Opfer and Siegler (2004) because they can process relational
structure. Relational structures allow us to make alignments
between otherwise dissimilar systems (e.g., Gentner 1989;
Holyoak & Thagard 1995) and to make inferences based on
relational – rather than only featural – commonalities (Opfer &
Bulloch 2007). Thus, having learned a predicate like goal-
directed agent, children can align otherwise dissimilar objects
(cats, potted plants) and generalize the properties of cats and
other goal-directed agents (e.g., living-thing) to plants as well.
These kinds of problems pose a difficulty for R&M’s model pre-
cisely because it represents neither relations (e.g., goal-directed)
nor relation-filler bindings explicitly. Consequently, R&M’s PDP
model cannot use relational information to drive inference (see
also Hummel & Holyoak 2003).
A recent model by Doumas et al. (2008), called DORA, provides
a solution to these problems. DORA is a connectionist model that,
by virtue of its solution to the dynamic binding problem, can rep-
resent relations as explicit symbols that can take arguments. Start-
ing with unstructured representations of objects as simple feature
vectors, DORA learns explicit representations of object properties
(and later relational roles) via comparison-based intersection dis-
covery. These representations are effectively single-place predi-
cates (represented as collections of nodes) that can be bound to
arguments. DORA then links sets of these single-place predicates
to form complete multi-place relations (where each of the linked
predicates serves as a role of the relation). Importantly, these rela-
tional roles can be dynamically bound to arguments. Like its pre-
decessor LISA (Hummel & Holyoak 2003), DORA uses time to
carry binding information. Roles are bound to their fillers by sys-
tematic asynchrony of firing, where bound roles and fillers fire in
direct sequence. For example, to bind Fido to the role chaser
and Felix to the role chased, DORA will fire the units representing
chaser followed by the units representing Fido, followed by the
units representing chased, followed by the units representing Felix.
Unlike R&M’s PDP model, successful models of semantic cog-
nition must be able to learn explicit representations of properties
and relations from examples and must bind these representations
to novel arguments. By exploiting the strengths of structured
relational thinking, successful models can make analogies based
on common relations and thereby generalize over shared
relations, just as children do when learning that, by virtue of
being goal-directed agents, plants – like animals – are living
things.
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